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Abstract
We propose the method to sanitize the privacy of the IFM(Input Feature Map)s
that are fed into the layers of CNN(Convolutional Neural Network)s. The method
introduces the degree of the sanitization that makes the application using a CNN
be able to control the privacy loss represented as the ratio of the probabilistic
accuracies for original IFM and sanitized IFM. For the sanitization of an IFM, the
sample-and-hold based approximation scheme is devised to satisfy an application-
specific degree of the sanitization. The scheme approximates an IFM by replacing
all the samples in a window with the non-zero sample closest to the mean of
the sampling window. It also removes the dependency on CNN configuration
by unfolding multi-dimensional IFM tensors into one-dimensional streams to be
approximated.
1 Introduction
CNN(Convolutional Neural Network) has become the representative DNN(Deep Neural Network)
since it overwhelms other techniques in the contest of image recognition [1] and its recent ad-
vances [2, 3] outperform the human beings in the image classification. However, it is not clearly
explained of what makes CNN better than human beings’ recognition. Thus, as presented in [4], if
CNN is used to leak a very private matter of individuals, it is very hard to prevent CNN from expos-
ing the privacy because we do not know what noise can hamper the recognition of a CNN. Actually,
some noise that does not affect humans’ recognition does make a huge difference for CNN [5]. Also,
some representation that does not make any sense for human may work for CNN [6]. One thing ob-
vious is that CNN learns all the things from the data fed into it. This implies what CNN recognizes
as a noise comes from the data set. In this paper, we mainly focus on how to add the effective noise
that disrupts CNN’s recognition for the purpose of privacy protection.
Differential privacy [7] is the mathematical definition that has been introduced to measure the pri-
vacy loss for the domains that handle massive user data such as data mining applications. Google [8]
and Apple [9] have adopted the differential privacy techniques into their crowdsourced applications
with some data sketching technique to approximate users’ private data. However, the approximation
techniques are devised to hide the privacy from the recognition of human beings. It would not be
applicable to CNN unless the way that CNN learns from data is similar to that of human being.
Preprint. Work in progress.
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The previous researches [10, 11] focus on the control of privacy loss in the learning stage of DNN
(particularly CNN since their experiments run on CNNs) rather than approximating the data that a
DNN processes for inference. Even if there is a way of hiding the privacy in the training stage, it
would be difficult to force all the applications using CNNs to follow the way. Especially for the
malicious attackers, the training method for the privacy-preservation can be the counter example of
how CNN must not be trained for capturing the private sensitive information. Moreover, in the case
that pre-trained CNNs are deployed on the personal devices such as mobile phone, the approach that
controls the privacy loss in a training stage would not be applicable.
In order to protect the privacy from the potentially malicious CNNs that users cannot change (nor
retrain in a privacy-preserving way), the privacy loss should be controlled in the level of FM(Feature
Map) data that the layers of CNNs process. For controlling the privacy loss by manipulating the
data that the layers of CNNs deal with, we need to resolve two difficulties: the various tensor
dimensions according to network configurations and finding the control-knob that makes sure of
lowering down the probabilistic accuracy. To remove the dependency on various tensor dimensions,
this research translates the multi-dimensional IFM(Input Feature Map) tensors into one-dimensional
streams before they are approximated for the privacy preservation.
The most difficult part finds the control-knob that reduces the probabilistic accuracy monotonically
in one direction (i.e. no accuracy increment happens when the accuracy is controlled to keep going
down). However, due to the limitation of the training dataset, CNN cannot learn all the possible
noises for a specific FM. Thus, when FMs are approximated, the accuracy increase would be ob-
served in a particular range even if the overall trend of accuracy goes down. Instead of finding the
best control-knob for a specific FM, this paper proposes the condition that any control-knob (that
approximates FMs) should satisfy. Thanks to the condition, even with the bad control-knob that
keeps oscillating the probabilistic accuracy up and down, we can preserve the privacy of CNNs in a
certain level that the condition designates.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the problem that controls the privacy loss of
CNN with the IFMs of layers. In Section 3, the degree of sanitization is introduced as the boundary
condition that the method of decreasing the probabilistic accuracy should satisfy. Also, the IFM
approximation scheme that reduces the accuracy and its network-wise control method are proposed.
Section 4 evaluates the proposed scheme on the layers of AlexNet in Caffe [12] CNN framework.
Finally, Section 5 concludes with the summary of our contribution.
2 Problem Description
In the traditional signal processing, the noisy signal sˆ(t) can be simply represented as the addition
of the original signal s(t) and noise N(t). In case that N(t) is clearly distinguished by a certain
condition such as the passband frequency, s(t) can be reconstructed from sˆ(t) by filtering out N(t).
However, CNN learns the condition that distinguishes s(t) and sˆ(t) from the data fed in the training
stage. Thus, it does not know all other noises which are not found in the data for training. To this
end, it is not guaranteed that adding random noises to IFMs decreases the probabilistic accuracy of
a CNN.
The ratio between the probabilistic accuracy of an original IFM and that of noisy IFM can be repre-
sented as the privacy loss,  that is defined by the differential privacy [7]. Intentionally adding noise
to data for the purpose of hiding private information is called "sanitization" process. We primarily
focus on the problem of sanitizing the IFMs for a CNN and it can be formulated by substituting
CNN terms for the differential-privacy ones:
Pr[F (d) ∈ S]
Pr[F (d′) ∈ S] ≤ exp() (1)
where the randomized function F is the last layer operation (e.g. softmax) of a CNN, d is the input
of the last layer of a CNN, d′ is the sanitized version of the input of the last layer in a CNN and S is
the subset of the label set L, whose elements have some probabilistic accuracies. The sanitization is
only valid if and only if  ≥ 0 in equation 1. In order to make  of equation 1 ≥ 0, the set of F (d′)
can be made as the subset of F (d)
{F (d′)|d′ ∈ D} ⊆ {F (d)|d ∈ D} (2)
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where F : D → L. Equation 2 can be expressed in terms of the IFM for the layer before the last
layer as below.
{F (F ′−1(d−1))|d−1 ∈ D−1} ⊆ {F (F−1(d−1))|d−1 ∈ D−1} (3)
where F−1 is the layer before the last layer of a CNN, d−1 is the IFM for the layer before the last
layer and F ′−1(d−1) means the sanitization of the OFM(Output Feature Map), F−1(d−1). According
to equation 2, the left term of equation 3 can be replaced by {F (F−1(d′−1))|d′−1 ∈ D−1} because
F ◦ F−1 can be regarded as a single function that has d−1 as its IFM. That is,
{F (F−1(d′−1))|d′−1 ∈ D−1} ⊆ {F (F−1(d−1))|d−1 ∈ D−1} (4)
Equation 3 describes the relation between the sets of original OFM and sanitized OFM for F−1.
However, equation 4 shows the relation between the original IFM and sanitized IFM for F−1. Thus,
equation 4 is better to represent the condition that the IFM sanitization in the layer before the last
layer of a CNN should satisfy. Suppose that the IFM d−k of the k-th layer from the last layer of a
CNN is sanitized as d′−k. By letting the function, G have d−k as its input and the output of the last
layer of a CNN as its output, the relation between the sets ofG(d−k) andG(d′−k) can be represented
as
{G(d′−k)|d′−k ∈ D−k} ⊆ {G(d−k)|d−k ∈ D−k}
By replacing G with F ◦ F−1 ◦ F−2... ◦ F−k
{F (F−1(F−2(...F−k(d′−k)...)))|d′−k ∈ D−k} ⊆ {F (F−1(F−2(...F−k(d−k)...)))|d−k ∈ D−k}
(5)
Equation 5 implies that IFM sanitization can make its result as the part of what an original IFM
results in without any change of CNN layers. In order to meet the equation 5, d′−k can be made by
sampling d−k. The sampling scheme assumes that all the samples of an original IFM contribute to
the probabilistic accuracy of an input image. The assumption is valid if the privacy loss,  increases
as the number of the samples selected in an IFM decreases. In the following section, we present the
sample-and-hold approximation to control the degree of the privacy loss.
3 Proposed Method
This section mainly discusses the way of controlling the privacy loss by sanitizing the IFMs of the
layers in a CNN. The degree of privacy loss can be differently configured according to the application
using a CNN. Section 3.1 introduces the degree of sanitization to select the better sanitization knob
to satisfy a given privacy loss. Also, Section 3.2 devises the sample-and-hold approximation that
sanitizes IFMs in fine-grained accuracy levels. Finally, Section 3.3 proposes the overall scheme
where sample-and-hold approximation is controlled by the degree of sanitization.
3.1 Degree of sanitization
The application using a CNN needs to control the privacy loss  of equation 1. However, the term
exp() can have some loss when it is approximated as the rational number to work for the boundary
condition. Moreover, the loss is changing according to . In order to remove the loss from the
boundary condition, we introduce here the parameter called the degree of sanitization, γ which
linearly scales the strength of IFM sanitization in the layers of a CNN. In equation 1, the privacy
loss  can be translated into the linear equation having the constant slope, ln2 if the probability for
the sanitized input is represented as 12γ× probability of the original input as shown in below:
Pr[F (d) ∈ S]
Pr[F (d′) ∈ S] =
Pr[F (d) ∈ S]
Pr[F (d) ∈ S]/2γ ≤ exp()
γ × ln2 ≤  (6)
In equation 6, γ determines the lower bound of the IFM sanitization. Figure 1 illustrates that γ is
used to evaluate the sanitization knob. In the figure, Pr[original] corresponds to the probability of
an original input, Pr[F (d) ∈ S] in equation 6.
In Figure 1, when γ ranges from 0 to 0.5, k1 (sanitization knob1) is better than k2 (sanitization
knob2) since it is able to cover the full range from Pr[original]20.5 to Pr[original]. In the same manner,
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Pr[original]
Accuracy
0.5
Pr[original]/2
2
Pr[original]/2
γ 
Pr[original]/2
Degree of 
sanitization
0.5 2 γ 
k1: sanitization knob1
k2: sanitization knob2
The range of probability when  
k2 is applied @0.5 ≤ γ ≤ 2 
The range of probability when  
k1 is applied @0.5 ≤ γ ≤ 2 
The range of probability that  
k1 covers more than k2 @γ 
Figure 1: The degree of sanitization γ determines the sanitization knob.
in the γ from 0.5 to 2, k2 is better (i.e. it covers from
Pr[original]
22 to somewhere beyond
Pr[original]
20.5
and close to P [original]). However, for the given γ that some application using a CNN might specify,
k1 is better than k2 because it covers the probability range that k2 does not include.
The sanitization method should decrease the probabilistic accuracy as the degree of sanitization
increases. But, no CNN learns all the possible noises for a specific IFM due to the limitation of
training dataset. So, there would be the cases of trend inversion where the probabilistic accuracy
increases as the degree of sanitization increases. Then, we should pick the sanitization scheme that
suppresses the trend inversion as much as possible. Section 3.2 develops the sanitization scheme
that minimizes the trend inversion.
3.2 Sample-and-hold approximation
Each layer of a CNN deals with IFMs as the multi-dimensional tensors having a different size from
other layers according to the way of stacking layers. In order to develop a sanitization scheme
regardless of CNN structure and tensor dimension, IFMs need to be streamized before they are
sanitized. That is, n−dimensional tensor Xi1,i2,...in ∈ RI1×I2×...×In needs to be unfolded as the
stream (i.e. one-dimensional tensor) Xi1 ∈ RsI1 where |RsI1 | = |RI1×I2×...×In |. We unfold the
tensors in the direction that a layer function runs on an IFM (i.e. IFM width→ IFM height→ IFM
channel).
Supposing that all the samples of an IFM contribute to the probabilistic accuracy, sample-and-hold
method can decrease the probabilistic accuracy by reducing the number of distinct samples in an
IFM (i.e. by increasing the size of a sampling window). The size of a sampling window corresponds
to the degree of sanitization γ of sample-and-hold approximation. To gradually decrease the proba-
bilistic accuracy as the size of a sampling window increases, sample-and-hold method should decide
which sample to select in a sampling window. In case a wrong sample is selected in the window,
the accuracy keeps oscillating even if the size of a sampling window increases (i.e. the degree of
sanitization increases) as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2 shows the probabilistic accuracy when the first sample is selected in each window of the
IFM for pool5 layer in AlexNet [1] when input image is the picture of king penguin. X−axis is the
size of a sampling window and y−axis is the probabilistic accuracy. Even though window-13 (i.e.
the case that window size is 13) has about 3.7 (≈ 48/13) × more samples than window-48 (i.e. the
case that window size is 48), the accuracy for window-13 is almost zero but that of window-48 is
close to one. This implies that the samples of an IFM do not evenly contribute to the probabilistic
accuracy. That is, the case of window-48 has some samples that the case of window-13 does not
have and the samples contribute to the probabilistic accuracy much more than other samples.
In order for the sample-and-hold approximation to reflect the importance of a sample, we develop the
method that selects the sample which is the closest to the average among the non-zero samples within
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window-13
window-48
Figure 2: Wrong sampling does not follow the trend of the degree of sanitization.
a window. The reason why average is computed only among non-zero samples is to prevent that the
least sample is always selected in the layers that zeros are dominant. Algorithm 1 summarizes the
proposed sample-and-hold approximation.
Algorithm 1 Proposed sample-and-hold approximation
1: Let the window having n samples be W = {w0, w1, ..., wn−1}
2: Make X = {xp|xp ∈Wn, xp 6= 0, 0 ≤ p ≤ (n− 1)}
3: if(X 6= ∅)
4: Find E[X] // Calculate the average among the non-zero samples in a window
5: // Find the sample closest to the non-zero average and let the sample represent an entire window
6: wq = argminx∈X(|x− E[X]|), wq ∈W
7: W = {wr|wr = wq, r = 0, 1, ..., n− 1}
8: endif
Algorithm 1 just describes the procedure applied to a single window. The overall sanitization scheme
when the degree of sanitization γ is given as a specification (i.e. constraint for a privacy loss) is
discussed in in Section 3.3.
3.3 Layer-wise sample-and-hold sanitization
Figure 3 shows how Algorithm 1 is applied for sanitizing the IFM of a CNN layer to satisfy the
condition that a given degree of sanitization γ specifies. The blue colored tasks and buffers are
required to be added for the layer-wise sanitization using Algorithm 1. In the figure, F is the last
layer of a CNN, n is the number of samples in a window and γ is the degree of sanitization. Also,
F−k is the k-th layer frmo the last layer of a CNN, d−k is the IFM of the k-th layer and d′−k is the
sanitized version of d−k. The buffer for γ and the task of checking if the inference result meets the
degree of sanitization work for an entire CNN. However, the sample-and-hold task and its output
buffer having d′−k, and the counting buffer "n++" which increases the size of a sampling window
are required for every layer in a CNN.
In Figure 3, the blue parts should be realized on the platform-level inference software (e.g. Caffe
inference) in order to invalidate any malicious attempt by changing the network configuration (e.g.
skipping the sanitization by replacing d′−k with d−k). The implementation is feasible since our
proposed scheme deletes the network dependency by translating the multi-dimensional IFM tensors
into one-dimensional streams. However, before the sanitized streams are fed into the next layer, they
should be tensorized to have the same dimension with the original IFM. To this end, the operational
dependency among the edges of the task "Algorithm 1" must be maintained as below:
start_readn++ < start_readd−k < start_writed′−k (7)
where start_readn++ is the start time of reading data from the counting buffer marked as "n++"
in Figure 3, start_readd−k is the start time of reading data from the buffer having the original IFM
d−k and start_readd′−k is the start time of writing data to the buffer for the sanitized IFM d
′
−k.
Proposed sample-and-hold sanitization provides the different distribution of probabilistic accuracies
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Algorithm1
Sample-and-
hold
n++
YES
γ
 
Tasks and Buffers added 
to control privacy loss
Original CNN tasks and their 
buffers holding tensors
d-(k+1) F-(k+1) d-k
d'-k F-k F
Pr[sanitized] 
if d'-k exists; 
otherwise, 
Pr[original]
Pr[sanitized] = Pr[F(F-1(F-2(...F-k(d'-k)…))) ∈ S]
Pr[original] = Pr[F(F-1(F-2(...F-k(d-k)…))) ∈ S]
condition(γ) can be either
γ x ln2 ≤ ln(Pr[original]/Pr[sanitized]) 
or
γ x ln2 ≤ ln(Pr[original]/Pr[sanitized]) 
≤ (γ + Δγ)  x ln2 where Δγ ≥ 0  
 
Inference result 
that satisfies  
condition(γ)
NO
condition(γ)
Figure 3: Layer-wise sanitization of an input feature map to meet the condition that a given degree
of sanitization γ describes
according to layers because the approximation selecting the sample closest to the average among the
non-zero samples is affected by the ratio of zeros and the sparsity of non-zero samples. In the next
section, we explore the layer-wise aspects of the proposed method through some evaluation metric.
4 Evaluation of Proposed Method
We evaluate the proposed sample-and-hold approximation in the layers of AlexNet [1]. Figure 4
shows two different IFMs are sanitized respectively by the proposed sample-and-hold approximation
when a picture of king penguin is fed into AlexNet for inference. X−axis indicates the size of
sampling window and y−axis notes the probabilistic accuracy. Larger sampling window degrades
probability accuracy more.
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Figure 4: Sanitization of pool5 and fc6 input feature maps in AlexNet
In Figure 4, the sanitization of pool5 IFM provides more steps for the probability reduction than the
case of sanitizing fc6 IFM does. In order to quantify the efficiency of the sanitization, we need to
measure the following ratio:
effsan =
The number of different probabilistic accuracies
The range of of sampling-window sizes
(8)
According to equation 8, the sanitization of pool5 IFM is more efficient than that of fc6 IFM because
effsan(fc6_ifm) = 42149 ≈ 0.28 and effsan(pool5_ifm) = 120149 ≈ 0.81. Table 1 lists effsans for all the
IFMs of AlexNet when the proposed sample-and-hold approximation which scales its window size
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Table 1: effsans for the input feature maps of AlexNet and the distribution of probabilistic accuracies
number of the different number of the different number of the different Ratio of zeros
IFMs effsan probabilistic accuracies probabilistic accuracies probabilistic accuracies in an original IFM
between 0.0 and 0.2 between 0.2 and 0.8 between 0.8 and 1.0 (= (number of zeros) /
(total number of samples)
in an orignal IFM )
conv1 0.07 9 0 2 0.0
(≈ 11/149) ( = 0/154587)
norm1 0.61 88 2 1 0.49
(≈ 91/149) (≈ 143153/290400)
pool1 0.22 30 1 2 0.49
(≈ 33/149) 1 (≈ 143153/290400)
conv2 0.19 27 1 1 0.11
(≈ 29/149) (≈ 7912/69984)
norm2 0.93 100 28 10 0.78
(≈ 138/149) (≈ 146290/186624)
pool2 0.87 115 4 10 0.78
(≈ 129/149) (≈ 146290/186624)
conv3 0.32 37 4 6 0.48
(≈ 47/149) (≈ 20874/43264)
conv4 0.15 18 0 4 0.73
(≈ 22/149) (≈ 47512/64896)
conv5 0.24 29 2 5 0.69
(≈ 36/149) (≈ 44785/64896)
pool5 0.81 70 23 27 0.88
(≈ 120/149) (≈ 38128/43264)
fc6 0.28 25 5 12 0.62
(≈ 42/149) (≈ 5693/9216)
fc7 0.02 2 1 0 0.85
(≈ 3/149) (≈ 3469/4096)
fc8 0.04 4 0 2 0.81
(≈ 6/149) (≈ 3330/4096)
from 2 to 150 is applied to the case where the picture of a king penguin is fed as the input image. It
also breaks down the range of probabilistic accuracies. Our sample-and-hold approximation selects
the non-zero sample having the minimum distance from the mean value among non-zero samples
and it replaces the sample with all others in a window. Thus, in an IFM, if the ratio of zeros is high
and non-zero samples are densely populated, effsan becomes high. Also, we can get a high effsan
in the IFM having a lot of samples.
In Table 1, norm1 IFM and norm2 IFM tend to have densely populated non-zero samples and large
amount of the zeros since both come from the consecutive convolution-relu operations. pool1 IFM
and pool2 IFM have the same zero-ratios with their corresponding norm IFMs (i.e. norm1 IFM for
pool1 IFM and norm2 IFM for pool2 IFM). However, their operations reduce the number of zeros
by replacing zeros with non-zero samples. Thus, their effsan becomes lower than their precedent
norm IFMs’. On the other hand, pool5 IFM which comes after successive convolution-relu pairs (i.e.
conv3-relu3, conv4-relu4 and conv5-relu5) gets high effsan due to the densely populated non-zero
samples and the high ratio of zeros.
Compared to other IFMs, both fc7 and fc8 IFMs have the small number of samples, 4096. This
means the number of sampling windows cannot be more than 2048 (since the minimum size of
sampling window is 2). For fc8 IFM, only length-2 and length-3 sampling windows go beyond the
probabilistic accuracy of 0.8. If the number of the different probabilistic accuracies ≥ 0.8 for fc8
IFM is scaled up to the case that has the same number of samples with pool2 IFM, (number of the
different probabilistic accuracies ≥ 0.8) : (total number of samples in an IFM) = 2 : 4096 = 10 : x
and x = 20480 (< 186624 for pool2 IFM). This means that fc8 IFM can have larger number of the
different probabilistic accuracies ≥ 0.8 than pool2 IFM if it has the same number of samples with
pool2 IFM.
effsan can be enhanced by approximating the multiple IFMs. If the approximation with a large
sampling window does not change the accuracy of an original IFM, the ineffectual non-zero samples
(that come from the approximation) can give more granules of the probabilistic accuracy to the
approximation of upcoming layers because the proposed sample-and-hold scheme works only on
non-zero samples. For example, in Table 1, norm2 IFM holds its probability as 1.0 until its sampling
window becomes 5. When pool5 IFM is sanitized with the norm2 IFM approximated by length-3 (
or length-5 ) sampling window, effsan and the distributions of probabilistic accuracies are changed
as Table 2. The norm2-IFM approximation enhances effsan of pool5 IFM and the approximation
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Table 2: effsans and the distribution of probabilistic accuracies when the proposed scheme sanitizes
the pool5 input feature map after norm2 input feature map is approximated to have the same accuracy
with the original input feature map
IFMs number of the different number of the different number of the different
effsan probabilistic accuracies probabilistic accuracies probabilistic accuracies
between 0.0 and 0.2 between 0.2 and 0.8 between 0.8 and 1.0
pool5 IFM after
original norm2 IFM 0.81 (120/149) 70 23 27
pool5 IFM after
norm2 IFM
approximated with 0.83 (125/149) 63 26 36
the length-3 window
pool5 IFM after
norm2 IFM
approximated with 0.90 (134/149) 57 28 49
the length-5 window
also tends to make pool5 IFM have more granules in the range of high probabilistic accuracies
(≥ 0.8). The more granules prolong the attenuation range of the probabilistic accuracies as shown
in Figure 5.
The last point that 
accuracy is higher than 0.2
Figure 5: Larger sampling window makes a longer attenuation range.
In Figure 5, X−axis is the size of sampling window and y−axis is the probabilistic accuracy. The
probabilistic accuracy of "pool5 IFM without norm2 approximation" becomes less than 0.2 when
the window size becomes larger than 86. However, "pool5 IFM with the norm2 approximation by
length-3 sampling window" goes below 0.2 for the window size ≥ 106 and "pool5 IFM with the
norm2 approximation by length-5 sampling window" needs to have the sampling window longer
than 113 to get its probabilistic accuracy lower than 0.2.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed the sample-and-hold approximation scheme that sanitizes the privacy of
the IFM(Input Feature Map)s that go through the layers of CNN(Convolutional Neural Network)s.
In order to remove the dependency on the network configuration coming from the various tensor
dimensions, the proposed approximation unfolds the multi-dimensional IFM tensors into the one-
dimensional stream. And then, the scheme selects the non-zero sample having the minimum distance
from the mean among the non-zero samples in a window, as the representative of the window to
reflect the importance of a sample by the probability mass and value.
Also, we introduce the degree of the sanitization which works as the systematic boundary condition
that prevents a certain amount of privacy from being leaked even in the case the proposed sample-
and-hold approximation does not work well. The proposed scheme is evaluated in the layers of
AlexNet by the metric, the efficiency of the sanitization which is affected by the ratio of zeros, the
density of non-zero samples and the number of samples in an IFM.
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